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This is the end, Beautiful friend
Tagline: Beauty died today. Or maybe yesterday; I can’t be sure.
1. Introductory parable
Father Adam is adminstrator for a scholarship program. This year there are two equally
qualified applicants, so he goes to Cardinal David and says “Full scholarships to both, I
presume.” Cardinal David says “No. Half scholarships to each.” It’s apparent that they
disagree, so they consult scripture (Ecclesiastes 1:9): “what has been done is what will be
done...there is nothing new under the sun.”
It’s discovered, however, that for as far back as records go, there has been a single schol-
arship applicant each year, who’s always been awarded a full scholarship. Confounded,
Father Adam and Cardinal David again consult scripture (Thessalonians 2:15): “...stand
firm and hold to the traditions that you were taught...by our spoken word or by our letter.”
But after a thorough perusal of paperwork and minutes turns up nothing, Father Adam
finds himself back in Cardinal David’s office complaining “There is no letter.” So they
wind up consulting scripture yet again (2 Corinthians 3:5-6): “God...has made us sufficient
to be ministers of a new covenant, not of the letter but of the Spirit.”
Meanwhile, word of the issue proliferates and many others weigh in. A Father Joseph,
citing the loaves and fishes trick, preaches that though the Church should only ante up
once, everyone who applies should still get a full scholarship. Eye-rolling followers of St.
Peter, under secular heat to deny Josephian faith in divine conceptions, want the applicants
to draw lots; St. Patrick’s world-wise disciples reply “just give it to whoever asked first.”
Finally a mystic (Father Jacob) has a vision on the Baltic Sea according to which two full
scholarships will be given on earth but that such action will recoil in the hereafter, with
apocalyptic consequences. Father Jacob, who wears a tunic emblazoned with the slogan
“The wisdom of your wise men will perish,” preaches that, ironically, the wisdom of the
wise men need perish precisely because the wise men themselves need not.
A lay majority eventually determines to entrust the decision to Cardinal David. (Who’s
not the Pope or anything, but he has had more time to think about it now and is awfully
good at this sort of thing.) But, it turns out that the wise man perishes that very night,
in his sleep. Which, as far as the current crisis is concerned, proves damn inconvenient.
Oh well–they’ll figure it out eventually.
2. Before dawn
Beauty’s days are numbered. (But how?)
In case you’ve been in a coma yourself, Sleeping Beauty (popularized by Elga 2000) is a
rational agent taking part in an experiment. She is awakened Monday morning, asked her
credence in heads, told what day it is and asked her credence again. If now the toss of a
fair coin lands heads, she’s put back to sleep until Wednesday morning. If tails, she’s put
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back to sleep but, in her sleep, is given a drug that erases all memory of that morning’s
experiences, and then on Tuesday suffers an analogous interview. Beauty knows all of this
in advance. The problem is what her initial personal credence in heads should be upon
initial wakeup. A halfer says one-half. A thirder says one-third. For halfers, there is a
second issue: Beauty’s credence in heads upon learning Monday.
Long viewed as something of a dead horse by many, Beauty has, of late, almost surely
proved wearisome even to those who’ve been making a living off of her predicament. To
parrot one of the more respectable (and apparently more marginalized) papers (Dorr 2005)
to emanate from this coterie, I intend to “regale you with yet another” take on Sleeping
Beauty. Which is more or less this: halfer credences are to thirder credences as population
proportions are to sample proportions in statistical sampling.
That’s how David Lewis (2001) saw halfing as well. If it’s right then it would be rather
strange to refer to halfer credences simply as “personal credences”, but not altogether
untenable, and, however named, halfer credence would at least survive as a distinct and
viable concept. But that isn’t the way things have played out in the literature, where a
rival form of halfing (so-called “double halfing”) has been seeing a lot more ink.
Double halfing tries to be less strange than Lewisian halfing (thus more credible as un-
adorned “personal credence”), but thereby violates diachronic norms (conditionalization).
It procurs any advantage that it has illicitly, pandering to the faulty intuitions responsible
for the Monty Hall fallacy. At great cost–double halfing violates reflection, a maligned no-
tion due to its appearance in various incorrect guises but surely a constraint on rationality
when properly formulated. Unchallenged acceptance of practices in violation of rational
constraints erodes our culture–a theme I pursue further in the second half of the paper,
where I take on the claim of Jacob Ross (2010) that there is a “deep tension” (leading to
“rational dilemmas”) between thirder reasoning and countable additivity of credences.
Several approaches to credences are explored here, including frequencies, evidence and
solutions to optimization problems. In the last case one can consider gamblers’ stakes and
maximize capital (utils), or invoke information theory and minimize surprisal. It’s the
policy governing accrual of the optimized quantity that matters. The naive view, which
Ross (2010) calls1 Every Awakening Legitimacy (EAL), is that relevant quantities accrue
twice if tails. This supports thirding (Elga 2000; Horgan 2004; Rosenthal 2009 etc.).
The competing view, Single Awakening Legitimacy (SAL), according to which relevant
quantities accrue precisely once, supports halfing (Bostram 2007; Hawley 2012; Jenkins
2005; Halpern 2004; D. Lewis 2001; P. Lewis 2007; Meacham 2008; Pust 2012; White 2006
etc.) provided Beauty isn’t “tipped off” as to the rate of accrual.
I assume (with apologies) familiarity with some concepts in information theory and stochas-
tic analysis. I will however keep the arguments brief, though they are for the most part
1More or less. I use the term somewhat more generally than Ross, and with different
emphasis. At any rate use of “legitimate” here is innocent. EAL is just a convention about
accrual of certain decision-theoretic quantities; it’s not a philosophical thesis.
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novel and, I think, necessary, sometimes improving on or amending deficiencies in extant
counterparts. When I’ve dispensed with an issue I’ll move on to the next without fanfare.2
Fleshing out is usually left as an exercise (in patience). Here’s a brief synopsis:
Section 3 is an elaboration on Elga’s (2000) argument for thirding, which I generally
commend. In the current climate we must view EAL was an unformulated premise, but it
would have been unrealistic to expect Elga to anticipate the somewhat bizarre rival SAL. I
do not, however, fully commend what Elga goes on to say about his argument. He’s right
to say that Beauty’s temporal location is relevant to heads, but wrong to say that Beauty
receives no new information relevant to heads upon waking. I’ll in fact argue that, though
unusual, thirder Beauty’s change of belief is quite classical in spirit.
In Section 4 I explain briefly how a broad range of arguments for thirding become arguments
for halfing (after David Lewis 2001) when EAL is swapped for SAL. I then give two informal
justifications for the plausibility of SAL, since that’s where thirders will attack. This step is
extremely important3 (Lewis’s argument is underdeveloped, as is that of Jenkins 2005, who
defends Lewis): SAL must square with the self indicating assumption. This is necessary to
avoid the “Doomsday” type arguments (I don’t analyze these carefully, but see Meacham
2008) that defeat what one might call “overgeneralized Lewisian halfing”.
Having escaped Doomsday there’s no reason not to dispense with double halfing. I do
this in Section 5, explaining along the way why the Monty Hallish example I use is more
ruinous than other merely “embarassing” attacks (such as Titelbaum 2012; see however
Dorr 2005 for a devastating treatment I don’t much improve on here–other than by making
it more clear that Lewis emerges unscathed).
In Section 6 I defend countable additivity of rational credences, both by an improved direct
argument and by showing that one of the assumptions Ross needs to generate “rational
dilemmas” from thirder reasoning spawns them by itself–i.e., independently of thirder
reasoning. Reading between the lines, I may appear to press further, suggesting that Ross’s
scenarios can (or should) be ignored in virtue of their high rational cost and specious
plausibility. I confess to the grounding temper (faith in the metaphysical possibility of
Ross’s scenarios as rank superstition), but loyalists can choose to stand by their nihilism
about rationality for all I say to the contrary here. My point is that their pessimism can’t
discriminate between halfism and thirdism.
2I am indebted to an anonymous referee for helpful comments relating to philosophical
jargon and several others for barometric readings on what can go wrong when mathemati-
cians try to talk to philosophers. (Essentially everything–thanks to those who responded.)
3Having undermined extant justifications for a one-half solution, the safer bet would be
to fall in with the thirders. But as explained in the text, halfing has more going for it than
just coherence, elegance and similarity to population proportions in statistical sampling (or
for an esoteric example, equal slice measures in combinatorial mathematics); it provides
continuity (where thirding doesn’t) in some aspects of decision-theoretic practice.
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Finally, in Section 7 I make a brief comparison with a related puzzle (appearing in Arntze-
nius 2003), that of “The Prisoner”.
3. Twice told tails: thirding and conditionalization on uncertain evidence
Subject to EAL, betting and frequency arguments capably vindicate thirding, as has been
argued by many others. Another type of argument is from surprisal.4 If an agent has
credence p in A, her surprisal (the number of bits of information acquired) upon learning
A is − log2 p. Since to know more now is to be surprised by less later, agents seek to
minimize surprisal. According to EAL, Beauty is surprised twice if tails, so her expected
surprisal during the experiment is −1
2
log2 p− 2 ·
1
2
· log2(1− p), minimized at p =
1
3
.
Arguments from evidence have spawned the most lively debate. Some thirders (such as
Elga 2000 and Arntzenius 2003) agree with Lewis that Beauty has no new evidence for
heads upon waking, while others (such as Horgan 2004) say that she has. EAL (which
thirders must accept) implies that she has. The road to why starts with the:
Self Indicating Assumption (SIA). Let h1, h2, . . . , hk be mutually exclusive events.
In the absence of further evidence, an observer’s credence in hi should be propor-
tional to the product of hi’s objective chance and the expected number of novel
observations, conditional on hi.
SIA is mandatory (modulo explication of novel) for rational agents. Cf. the so-called
Doomsday argument: denial of SIA and near-one-half objective chance of near-term hu-
man extinction implies that, conditioned on self-locating evidence that one is an early
human, near-term extinction becomes practically certain. As to how SIA works, to count
novel observations in normal cases is to count congruence classes under the same observer
relation. What’s not clear is whether non-communicating time-slices of the same indi-
vidual qualify as different observers. Applied to the accrual of novel observations as a
decision-theoretic quantity, EAL says yes: two novel observations if tails, one if heads. SIA
and Elga’s indifference principle (which says that Monday and Tuesday should be taken as
equally likely conditional on tails) together yield the familiar Elgain centered credences:
Monday Tuesday
Heads 1
3
0
Tails 13
1
3
So the one-third solution follows from indifference, self-indication and EAL.
4From a surprisal perspective, EAL seems indicated when Beauty is debriefed after each
interview, whereas a single deferred surprisal associated to multiple non-communicating
interviews may generate sympathy for SAL. Credences shouldn’t depend on debriefing, so
this dialectic further supports the convention hypothesis in the EAL/SAL debate. (Non-
logarithmic scoring rules, incidentally, which are inappropriate as measures of information
gain, have also been discussed in the Sleeping Beauty literature. I don’t know why.)
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But did Beauty gain evidence? Is the observation expressible as I am awakened now
informative? In normal cases, an observation is informative precisely when one’s prior
probability in it is less than 1. Horgan (2004) claims that Beauty’s priors are given by:
Monday Tuesday
Heads 1
4
1
4
Tails 1
4
1
4
Pust (2008) disagrees, and indeed, it doesn’t seem that Beauty can have access to her
previous timestep priors at all, as her final prospective centered credences are different on
Monday than they are on Sunday. One could try to take a weighted average of her priors
over candidate previous timesteps. Doing this, I suspect P−(wakeup) could come out to
be strictly less than 1: if not debriefed, Beauty’s final Monday credence in wakeup is such.
Dependence on debriefing has its pitfalls, though, so I won’t pursue this line.5
Jenkins (2005), defending Lewis, writes “Beauty’s subjective experience on waking is ex-
actly the same’ (however the toss lands)....(so) Beauty has no interestingly new evidence
on waking.” But such an antecedent requires only that credence be uniform across awak-
enings. It’s her tails experience throughout the experiment that reflects on heads, and (if
we grant EAL) this is interestingly different from her heads experience–it consists in two
experimental awakenings. That’s interesting because it implies that experimental awaken-
ings are relevant to heads (by virtue of confirming tails) to the degree that they might be
second awakenings.
It’s tempting to reply that although Beauty may have seen evidence sufficient to confirm
tails, she can’t remember it and, therefore, can’t factor it into her credences. But it’s
classical (cf. so-called Jeffrey conditionalization) that uncertain evidence does play a role
in rational credence formation.6 That her current uncertain evidence is not grounded in
any certain proposition seems neither here nor there. She can discount neither that this
might be a second legitimate awakening, nor that, if it is, the coin surely landed tails.
Rational agents (thirders and halfers alike) are required to condition on what evidence
they’ve seen, and that includes accounting for available evidence they might have seen.
The familiar calculation makes clear where Beauty’s information comes from.
P (heads) = P (2nd)P (heads|2nd) + P (∼ 2nd)P (heads| ∼ 2nd) =
1
3
· 0 +
2
3
·
1
2
=
1
3
.
5Another option is to parse now rigidly. If today is Tuesday, I am awakened now means I
am awakened Tuesday, which is informative. If I am awakened nowmight be informative, it
is informative, i.e. relevant to decision theory and epistemology. (Dretske’s Knowledge and
the Flow of Information to the contrary notwithstanding, that’s how information works.)
This is more or less what I do in the text; see also the final section.
6It’s ironic that Jeffrey conditionalization appears to be a superfluous addition to clas-
sicism in classical cases, where, given observations that have led one to an uncertain con-
viction, one can always just condition on the fact that there were such observations.
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There remains the question of what to do upon learning Monday. In the usual case, for
a potential observation e there is an uncentered proposition Le such that Le holds if and
only if e is observed in the prevailing epistemic circumstance. In Beauty’s case something
similar holds, but with a change: Le is now a centered proposition. Elga recommends
conditionalization of centered credences on the centered event Le upon observation of e.
Pust (2012) makes a counterargument that runs somewhat as follows: one cannot condition
on Le because one has no prior credence in Le. Say at 9:05 Beauty learns Monday. What
then is the content of Le? Not I learn Monday at 9:05 on Monday, which she already
knew, but it’s now 9:05 on Monday. However, she had prior credence 0 in the assertion
expressed by those words at the previous timestep (say at 9:00).
This strikes me as more of a filibuster than a serious objection. In local coordinates,
one has, at timestep z := now , a probability distribution Pz over future observations
{ez+t : t > 0}. (On a view standard in stochastic analysis, that’s just what a credence
function is.) Now upon observation of B = {ez+t : 0 < t ≤ q}, one has, e.g.,
Pz+q({ez+q+t : 0 < t ≤ r}) =
Pz({ez+t : 0 < t ≤ q + r})
Pz({ez+t : 0 < t ≤ q})
.
Expressing new evidence in local coordinates like this avoids proliferation of confusing
indexicals, skirting the aforementioned “objection”. A further attempt at stonewalling is
that later when now = z+t the observation enow won’t have the same cognitive significance
as the centered event {ez+t} contemplated at timestep z. By analogy with Hesperus and
Phosphorus, this worry must surely be based on the idea that, although now = z + t,
Beauty doesn’t know that now = z + t. But she does, so that’s another non-issue.
4. Asked and answered: halfers as dilutional self indicators
Whereas EAL supports thirding, SAL supports halfing. But SAL is in want of defense.
The standard defense of halfing (no new evidence) requires SAL as a premise, so it can’t
help, but halfers have resources in the realms of frequency, information...and wagering.
Indeed, the literature is rife with betting protocols mirroring SAL. Bostrom (2007) proposes
a thought experiment (Beauty the high roller) where bets are offered to Beauty on Mondays
only. Adding phony bets on Tuesdays so she won’t be tipped off, Beauty then follows
Hawley (2012), who assigns Monday probability 1 conditioned on tails. Scheduling the
one bet on Monday or Tuesday with equal likelihoods conditioned on tails recalls Peter J.
Lewis’s (2007) quantum Sleeping Beauty interpretation. Shaw (2013) introduces bets that
Beauty can make only (and only once) by agreeing to them during each awakening of the
experiment, a global reward perspective evoking Lewis’s (2001) answer (borrowed from
statistics) to tails world oversampling: sample weight dilution of the tails awakenings.
Still, one needs a reason to regard single-bet protocols as something other than a con-
trivance in the underspecified case. Nor again should the reason contradict SIA. Other-
wise, in order to avoid Doomsday halfers will have to violate diachronic norms, and that’s
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a bad idea. (See below.) Here then are two senses (relating to betting and information,
respectively) in which SAL naturally extends credence’s prior conceptual underpinnings
without compromising SIA. (A sense relating to frequency is left to a footnote.)
1. Day late, dollar short: in wagering scenarios, capital goes proxy for utility, and in
normal cases rational agents have access to their utility balance. (If agents can’t, upon
ideal reflection, figure out that they’ve been punished or rewarded, they haven’t been.) If
we preserve this, Beauty’s utility can’t take a double hit: her utility function gets reset
along with her memory. Otherwise, thinking of betting heads on Tuesday, she will, upon
reflection, note that she’s a “dollar short”, infer that she’s a “day late”, and not bet.
2. Asked and answered: in normal cases, accrued surprisal measures information acquired
since initiation of scoring. Preserving this7, one must abandon realtime surprisal as basis of
the rule’s explication to Sleeping Beauty scenarios. This creates an injunction against dou-
ble counting of information, leading to SAL implemented by Lewisian dilution of Beauty’s
tails awakenings.8
These observations indicate that certain properties of the decision theory grounding prior
use of “credence” are only preserved by SAL (as others are preserved only by EAL). These
aren’t skeptical nonsense properties like quassociativity, which one might claim grounds a
rival explication (quus) of plus to heretofore untested cases. What we have here are two
sets of ordinary, sensible properties of decision theoretic practice that were always coupled
before but have come apart now. Nothing about our prior use determines which set we
must aim to preserve. Indeed, we should expect this choice to depend on our intentions.
It’s less controversial that when one incorporates SAL into arguments for thirding, they
become arguments for halfing. It’s obvious that one-wager protocols (betting paradigm
versions of SAL) lead to halfing behavior, and that when counting just one tails awakening
per tails toss the long-run frequency of heads awakenings will be one-half. It’s equally
7Logarithmic scoring requires information theoretic independence of iterated questions
in cases where answers are withheld, a condition violated under EAL. A similar point about
stochastic independence in the frequency argument was made by Schervish et. al. (2004),
who wrote “the repeated trials in Sleeping Beauty’s game do not form an independent
sequence, and her mandated forgetfulness precludes any ‘feedback’ about the outcome of
past previsions. When repeated trials are dependent and there is no learning about past
previsions, coherent previsions may be very badly calibrated in the frequency sense.”
8Strange as dilution is, the alternatives are worse. Hawley (2012) for example uses
a principle of “inertia” to peddle wholesale disenfranchisement of Tuesday’s awakening,
assigning credence 1 to Monday. Inertia solves some problems but cripples one’s ability
to respond appropriately to new evidence. Indeed, if Beauty buys in literally and the coin
lands tails she’ll spend the rest of her life (starting Tuesday) thinking it’s a day earlier than
it actually is, mounting evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. (On the other hand,
quantum style disenfranchisement seems to be a viable alternative to dilution.)
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straightforward how the information-theoretic argument gets changed: under SAL, only
one tails surprisal should be scored, which means that the quantity to be minimized is
−12 log2 p−
1
2 log2(1−p) (this occurs at p =
1
2 ). The thirder argument from evidence, mean-
while, required multiple awakenings; initial awakenings aren’t relevant to heads. Granting
that Monday tails and Tuesday tails should be given equal credence (an “indifference”
principle proposed by Elga 2000 and accepted in most of the literature), SAL cashes out
as Lewisian centered credences:
Monday Tuesday
Heads 12 0
Tails 14
1
4
These numbers also serve as Lewis’s priors, which explains Lewis’s claim that Beauty learns
nothing on waking. From the standpoint of her decision theory, Beauty’s diluted halves
exist in parallel. Both are viewed as immediate successors to Beauty’s waning Sunday
moments–no part of her experiences both tails awakenings.
Half-baked? Approximately. When Beauty learns Monday, though, watch out.
5. ‘Deal’ breaker: double halfers and the flouting of protocol
The most infamous artifact of dilution is that when a Lewisian Beauty learns Monday, her
credence in heads jumps to 23 . Self-indication cuts both ways, and Monday’s wakeup counts
as just half an observation if tails; put another way, Monday half-awakenings confirm heads
to the degree that they might be second half-awakenings. If that’s not strange enough,
consider fellow Lewisian Sleeping Gorgeous, who gets awakened once if tails, twice if heads.
Gorgeous has credence 13 in heads upon learning Monday. She and Beauty, who we can
take to have been awakened in the same room, agree about how to determine credences,
can talk to each other about their evidence, trust each others’ judgments and yet find
themselves on opposite sides of objective chance concerning a future toss of a fair coin.
That’s too strange, say thirders and some would-be halfers. A “double halfer” is a halfer
who continues, contra Lewis, to assign heads credence one-half upon elimination of a tails
scenario.9 Double halfing is halfing combined with a scheme whereby Beauty updates
propositional credences in response to centered evidence by conditioning on the proposition
corresponding to the set of worlds consistent with the evidence. Such updating is advocated
by (Bostrom 2007; Halpern 2004; Meacham 2008; Pust 2012; White 2006).
Bostrom refers to his such brand of halfing as a “hybrid model”. Indeed, double halfers
appear to sport multiple personalities. Like Lewis, they start out in apparent deference
9Or at least tries to. As shown in Cian Dorr’s refreshing unpublished manuscript (2005),
if there are n equally likely, mutually discriminable ways that Beauty’s awakening could
go down, double halfer credence in heads upon observing one of them is actually n3n−1 , so
that in practice double halfers are effectively thirders. Lewisian halfing doesn’t suffer this
amusing feature (cf. day late, dollar short and asked and answered, which aren’t based on
anything like identicality of awakenings).
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to SAL, but when a tails scenario is eliminated, double halfers assign full weight to the
remaining one, which is indicative of a switch to EAL. The result is a halfing scheme that
looks to be a kneejerk response to Lewisian strangeness.
However, it’s a scheme that fails viability by virtue of its neglect of protocol. On the one
hand, there are no natural betting/scoring protocols under which Beauty should behave
as a double halfer. (Under such a protocol, how many legitimate bets will Beauty make
if tails? One on Monday and one on Tuesday, for a total of...one. That’s not good.) The
locus classicus for evidential protocol’s role in updating meanwhile is Monty Hall, and in
fact one defender of Lewisian halfing (Jenkins 2005) promises that a “fruitful comparison”
can be made between Monty Hall and the problem of how halfers should update upon
learning Monday. It’s possible to deliver on this promise in an extremely direct way.
Suppose that a big prize is hidden behind one of three doors, each with equal objective
chance. The hypothesis Door i corresponds to the state of affairs in which the big prize
is behind Door i. If Door 1, Beauty will have a single awakening, on Monday. If Door
2, Beauty will have a single awakening, on Tuesday. And, if Door 3, Beauty will have
two awakenings, on Monday and Tuesday. Halfers of course assign each of the alternatives
credence 13 upon awakening.
Suppose now that a halfer learns what day it is, and is asked for her updated credence in
Door 3. Note: if Monday, Door 1 is eliminated. If Tuesday, Door 2 is eliminated. Door
3 cannot be eliminated. Recall that our halfer has prior credence 13 in Door i for each i
and, if she accepts Elga’s principle, Monday and Tuesday are equally likely conditioned on
Door 3. Suppose our halfer learns Monday. Since the current protocol is isomorphic to
that of the Monty Hall problem, her situation is precisely that of a Monty Hall contestant
that has initially chosen Door 3 and seen the hypothesis Door 1 eliminated.
Accordingly, halfers who update credences by conditioning on not Door 1 are commit-
ting the very error of those who answer 1
2
in the Monty Hall problem, in defiance of the
understood protocols. On the contrary, Beauty’s credence in Door 3 must remain 13 .
10
This “embarrassment” for double halfers differs from that of Titelbaum’s (2012) in an
important respect. The main consequence of his observations is that if Beauty subscribes
to Elga’s indifference principle and performs the fateful toss herself (hence a corresponding
meaningless toss on Tuesday) then in order to maintain credence 12 in Monday’s toss
landing heads she has to assign credence 58 to the centered proposition today’s toss will
10What else? It violates reflection for Beauty to update credence in Door 3 from 1
3
to 1
2
upon learning what day it is regardless of what day it is. In fact that’s Rosenthal’s
(2009) argument for thirding; alter the original problem so that the single heads awakening
occurs on either Monday or Tuesday (with equal probabilities). Rosenthal takes it as
uncontentious (double halfers agree) that Beauty’s credence in heads upon learningMonday
is 13 . The same holds for Tuesday, so absolute credence in heads must be
1
3 . (The argument
doesn’t net Lewis, for whom Beauty’s credence in heads upon learning Monday is 12 .)
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land heads. As this applies to Lewis as well, Titelbaum clearly intends for his indictment
to extend to other halfers, and only singles out double halfers because Lewis has already
embraced similarly counterintuitive consequences in print.11 The mishandling of Monty
Hall, however, isn’t merely an embarrassment...it’s a deal breaker. And as Lewis responds
correctly to the given protocol, it’s entirely on double halfers.
6. Sleeping Methuselah: on self indication and countable additivity
Rational credences are generally taken to be constrained by:
Countable Additivity (CA). For any countable, pairwise incompatible set of propo-
sitions, the sum of one’s credences in the propositions in the set must equal one’s
credence in their disjunction.
Not by everyone. Some question the legitimacy of the several extant Dutch Book arguments
in support of CA. An argument with finitely many stakes should answer these questions.
Let X be a random variable on the naturals and consider a credence function P such that
∑
∞
n=1 P (X = n) = 1− ǫ < 1. For a large M , let (Xi)
M
i=1 be independent random variables
distributed as X is. An agent subscribing to P has Xi revealed to her in turn. After
X1, . . . , Xi−1 are revealed, she may bet a dollar that Xi > max{Xj|1 ≤ j < i}. If she
wins, she gets 2
ǫ
dollars. For any k, P (Xi > k) ≥ ǫ, so she’ll take the bets.
Next, imagine that we have M ! agents, all subscribing to P . Each is assigned a different
permutation π of {1, 2, . . . ,M} and is offered a series of bets like that of the previous
paragraph, but with the Xi’s revealed in the order Xπ(1), . . . , Xπ(M) (the agent wins the
ith bet if Xπ(i) > max{Xπ(j)|1 ≤ j < i}). They all bet from the same account. To break
even, the proportion of bets they win must be at least ǫ
2
. But if Xi is the kth largest
out of X1, . . . , XM (ties broken arbitrarily), the probability of a randomly selected agent
winning when Xi is revealed is at most
1
k
, meaning that the proportion of winning bets is
at most 1
M
(1 + 12 +
1
3 + · · ·+
1
M
) ≈ logM
M
, which tends to zero as M increases. For large
M , the P -subscribers collectively suffer a sure loss, so it’s irrational to subscribe to P .
Ross (2010) doesn’t reject CA, but he does claim that there are situations in which one is
unable to subscribe to thirder reasoning while simultaneously satisfying CA. The one he
describes is a Sleeping Beauty problem (“a problem in which a fully rational agent, Beauty,
will undergo one or more mutually indistinguishable awakenings...” where the number of
such awakenings is a function of a discrete random variable taking values in a set S of
“hypotheses”) in which the expected number of awakenings is infinite. His claims about
what thirders are committed to starts with the following “indifference principle”:
11Not everything counterintuitive is embarrassing, and I see little reason why Lewis’s
2
3 should be more embarrassing than his original choice of
1
2 , which is equally (and as
intentionally) bad at conforming to rational expectations under the more natural premise
EAL–surely the source of any intuitive insult. Ditto Titelbaum’s 58 (for Lewis, anyway).
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Finitistic Sleeping Beauty Indifference (FSBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for
any hypothesis h in S, if the number of times Beauty awakens conditional on h is
finite, then upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each of the
awakening possibilities associated with h.
Note: FSBI is too strong. All thirders are committed to is adoption of solutions to appro-
priately formulated (in particular, employing EAL as a premise) optimization problems
whenever such exist. It’s easy to show that such solutions satisfy indifference, but thirder
reasoning is silent in the no-solution case. Ross’s thesis should be framed as tension be-
tween EAL and the principle that rational credences exist in all logically possible scenarios;
I for one would accept the argument as a successful reductio against such a principle.
At any rate FSBI, together with some additional premises (details omitted), leads to a:
Generalized Thirder Principle (GTP). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, upon first
awakening, Beauty’s credence in any given hypothesis in S must be proportional
to the product of the hypothesis’ objective chance and the number of times Beauty
will awaken conditional on this hypothesis.
A pathological example is introduced, purporting to show that GTP is in conflict with CA:
Sleeping Beauty in St. Petersburg (SBSP). Let S = N and suppose that Beauty
awakens 2X times, where X is a random variable with P (X = n) = 2−n, n ∈ N.
If Beauty subscribes to GTP, then in SBSP it would appear that she must assign equal
credences to the exhaustive and mutually exclusive assertions X = n, which violates CA.
As mentioned, in SBSP the expected number of awakenings,
∑
h∈H Ch(h)N(h), is infinite.
Here Ch(·) denotes objective chance and N(h) is the number of awakenings associated
with h. So SBSP can’t be faithfully implemented at our world, nor at any nomologically
accessible world, nor for that matter at any world subject to a reasonably time stationary
threat of mortality (which, arguably, includes all metaphysically possible worlds). As the
example requires infinite expectation in order to do its work, it isn’t clear, therefore, how
to interpret Ross’s reports of a deep tension between GTP and CA.
More seriously, in the context of Ross’s ambitions GTP is a red herring. Ross argues from
conflict between GTP and CA to rational dilemmas, i.e. “contexts in which full rationality
is impossible”. But what if the only worlds at which the conflict can arise are so crazy that
everyone finds it impossible to achieve full rationality there? Ross takes this possibility
seriously, for he briefly considers the following premise:
Sleeping Beauty Indifference (SBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for any hy-
pothesis h in S, upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each
of the awakening possibilities associated with h.
Ross notes that if everyone is committed to SBI, then everyone should reject CA (hence
full rationality is impossible for everyone), regardless of whether they accept GTP. This
would undermine his thesis, and he’s quick to deflate it, in particular by substituting FSBI
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for SBI, which he hopes will pull halfers back in line with CA. But SIA is advisable for all
(including halfers), so everyone taking SBSP at face value should still reject CA. For any
world supporting faithful implementation of SBSP will also support a version with unique
subjects, and self indication in such contexts still runs afoul of CA.
Not that it’s a plausible alternative anyway, but halfers can’t even get out of this by
rejecting SIA, as face-value interpretation of SBSP wrecks rational decision theory entirely
on its own. For consider a situation in which Beauty has been sentenced to an SBSP-
style incarceration (without memory erasure) involving mild torture. She’s free to choose
between two rival detention facilities (A and B) to carry out the sentence. Each has already
computed the number of days they would confine her. She’s chosen A, but this choice is
arbitrary. Now she will be offered a sequence of two trades that she’ll have to accept if
she believes that her expected time of incarceration is infinite, but which will leave her
worse off. First, the judge (who doesn’t know the values N) offers her a halving of her
sentence to switch facilities. By indifference, she accepts, and switches to B. Next, the
judge asks representatives of A to reveal their number and offers to let her switch back.
At a price–the quadrupling of her previously halved sentence. This is twice as much time
as she was originally going to serve. Nevertheless she accepts, as E(NB) =∞.
The upshot is that there are finite expectation constraints on rationality. For Beauty:
Finite Expectation (FE). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, if N(h) denotes the
number of awakenings associated with h, then Beauty’s credences {P (h) : h ∈ S}
should satisfy
∑
h∈S P (h)N(h) <∞.
Some have interjected that adoption of FE is tantamount to changing the subject–avoiding
issues rather than engaging with them. Only professional desperation could drive anyone
to such an extreme form of irrational pessimism. Let Beauty reject FE (by taking SBSP at
face value). According to the example, she’s abandoned effective decision (and so embraced
nihilism about rationality), irrespective of her views on self indication. That self indication
can make trouble for CA now is quite beside the point. Everybody knows she’s got troubles
and, in point of fact, she no longer qualifies as a rational agent anyway.
The question of the steep rational toll of eschewing finite expectation constraints vs. the
power-to-model or expressiveness costs, if any, of adhering to them, meanwhile, isn’t nec-
essarily uninteresting. I’ve stated my views but haven’t argued for them. Suffice it to say
that it’s an old topic (see, e.g., Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997 or Gallager 2014 (Chapter
6, esp. Summary12)) quite separate from Ross’s ostensive concerns.
12In particular, the “paradox” regarding countable additivity for null recurrent Markov
chains (SBSP qualifies, as described) isn’t new; asymptotic “forgetfulness” as to number
of transitions since initiation is a by-product of finite-state mind, so it’s never been nec-
essary to postulate SB-style memory erasure in order to generate “violations” of CA. The
folklore view (canvassed by Gallager 2014) that has emerged in the sciences provides stark
contrast to Ross’s comparatively radical conclusions. Indeed, the latter echo McGee 1999,
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7. Stop, thief ! The unequivocality of ostensive indexicals and The Prisoner
A comparison of Sleeping Beauty with Arntzenius’s (2003) Prisoner is enlightening. The
Prisoner is waiting in his cell, where there is no clock, hoping for a stay of his scheduled
execution. Right now, his credence in I am executed is one-half. A helpful guard will turn
out the light in the cell at precisely midnight if and only if he is to be executed. Otherwise
the light stays on. At 11:59, the light will surely be on but The Prisoner won’t be sure
whether or not it’s past midnight, and will take his suspicion that it might be as partial
evidence in favor of his stay having been granted. If his internal clock (apart from the
light being on) assigns after midnight probability one-half then, like Beauty’s credence in
heads, The Prisoner’s credence in executed will have dropped to one-third.
The analogy probably shouldn’t be pressed. The Prisoner is a more typical sort of Bayesian
than Beauty. Suppose he sees a clock at 6 P.M. By propogation of this evidence through
his time slices he learns, for any future “internal time” x, the probability c(x) that the
actual time is past midnight, and it’s conditionalization on the further fact that the light is
on at the internal time x he experiences at 11:59 (an uncentered proposition) that causes
his credence in executed to have fallen; Beauty’s evidence is intrinsically centered.
On the other hand, to press the analogy–say by parsing “the light is on now” rigidly–as
“the light is on at 11:59” or “the light is on at 12:04”, as the case may be–isn’t technically
wrong. Such a move introduces uncertainty in the referent of the indexical now, just as
we saw in Beauty’s case (see footnote 5 above). What matters is whether now is before
or after midnight–just as for Beauty what mattered was whether now was Monday or
Tuesday. If he were to learn before, he would conclude that he has no evidence. If he were
to learn after, he would have certain evidence for stay. So credences can be determined by
averaging over possible referents, same as for Beauty.
But, whereas The Prisoner can avoid this sort of rigidity, it appears to be forced on Beauty.
She has to parse “I am awakened now” as “I am awakened on Monday” or “I am awakened
on Tuesday” because when my internal state is so-and-so is equivocal where the ostensive
now is not. This, I think, is what makes the Sleeping Beauty problem vexing. “I am
awakened when my internal state is so-and-so” is what seems uninformative.
So it is...it’s just not what “I am awakened now” means.
who (observing that he would trade a jelly bean for a place in heaven, if it exists) opined
that decision theory can tell us, at best, “how to comport ourselves in the gambling hall
or the brokerage house”. The conservative view is to reject this attitude, as (a) in the
relevant sense, science independently describes our universe as a “gambling hall”, (b) it’s
irrational to do otherwise, and incidentally (c) if one insists (inadvisably) on entertaining
other-wordly consequences for worldly actions then one must account for the (more meta-
physically respectable) scenario of a recurrence under which one surrenders such “beans”
in perpetuity.
13
References
Arntzenius, Frank. 2003. Some problems for conditionalization and reflection. Journal of
Philosophy. 7: 356-370.
Arntzenius, Frank and McCarthy, David. 1997. The two envelope paradox and infinite
expectations. Analysis. 57:42-50.
Bostrom, Nick. 2007. Sleeping beauty and self location: A hybrid model. Synthese.
157:59-78.
Dorr, Cian. 2005. A challenge for halfers. Unpublished manuscript. Available at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/˜sfop0257/papers/ChallengeForHalfers.pdf
Elga, Adam. 2000. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem. Analysis 60:143-
147.
Gallager, Robert G. 2011. Stochastic Process: Theory for Applications. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 2014.
Halpern, Joseph. 2004. Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in
Asynchronous Systems. Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Hawley, Patrick. 2012. Inertia, Optimism and Beauty. Nous. 47:85-103.
Horgan, Terry. 2004. Sleeping Beauty awakened: new odds at the dawn of the new day.
Analysis 63:10-21.
Jenkins, Carrie Ichikawa. 2005. Sleeping Beauty: A wake up call. Philosophia Mathemat-
ica 13:194-201.
Lewis, David. 2001. Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga. Analysis 61:171-176.
Lewis, Peter J. 2007. Quantum Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 67: 59-65.
McGee, Vann. 1999. An airtight Dutch book. Analysis 59:257-265.
Meacham, Christopher. 2008. Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Beliefs. Philo-
sophical Studies 138:24569.
Pust, Joel. 2008. Horgon on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160:97-101.
Pust, Joel. 2012. Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence. Journal of
Philosophy 109:295-315.
Rosenthal, J. S. 2009. A mathematical analysis of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Mathe-
matical Intelligencer 31:32-37.
Ross, Jacob. 2010. Sleeping Beauty, countable additivity, and rational dilemmas. The
Philosophical Review 119: 411-447.
Schervish, M.J., Seidenfeld, T. and Kadane, J.B. 2004. Stopping to reflect. Journal of
Philosophy. 6:315-322.
Shaw, James R. 2013. De se belief and rational choice. Synthese 190:491-508.
Titelbaum, Michael. 2012. An embarrassment for double halfers. Thought 1:146-151.
White, Roger. 2006. The generalized Sleeping Beauty problem: a challenge for thirders.
Analysis 66:114-119.
rmcctchn@memphis.edu
14
